Some fundamental problems in Becker, Grossman and Murphy's implementation of rational addiction theory by Wangen, Knut Reidar
Discussion Papers No. 375, April 2004 
Statistics Norway, Research Department 
Knut R. Wangen 
Some Fundamental Problems in 
Becker, Grossman and Murphy's 
Implementation of Rational 
Addiction Theory 
Abstract: 
The econometric implementation of rational addiction theory has been highly influenced by Becker, 
Grossman and Murphy (BGM). They specify an Euler equation where current consumption is 
determined by current price and past and future consumption. This model is claimed to be able to 
discriminate between rational addictive, myopic addictive, and non-addictive behavior. However, as 
demonstrated in this paper, the coefficients of the Euler equation are not structural parameters. 
Provided that two implausible assumptions do not hold, the Euler equation coefficients for the 
rational addict are shown to be non-constant. But even when these assumptions are assumed to be 
valid, the coefficients of the Euler equation will vary under the alternative hypothesis of myopic 
addiction. Moreover, and in contrast to the common interpretation, BGM's non-addicted consumer is 
influenced by past consumption, implying that a rational and a myopic non-addict behave differently. 
These problems makes it unclear how analyses based on the BGM approach can support, or reject, 
rational addiction theory. 
Keywords: Rational addiction, Euler equation 
JEL classification: D11, D12, I10 
Acknowledgement: I owe a special thank to Erik Biørn, John K. Dagsvik, and Rolf Aaberge for 
helpful advices. For discussions and suggestions on various drafts, thanks to Jørgen Aasness, Anne 
Line Bretteville-Jensen, Torbjørn Hægeland, Arvid Raknerud, Ole Jørgen Røgeberg, Dag Einar 
Sommervoll, and Hege Torp. All remaining errors are my own. The project has been partly financed 
by the Norwegian Research Council (project no. 111097/330). 
Address: Knut R. Wangen, Statistics Norway, Research Department.  
E-mail: knut.reidar.wangen@ssb.no 
 
 
Discussion Papers comprise research papers intended for international journals or books. As a preprint a 
Discussion Paper can be longer and more elaborate than a standard journal article by in-
cluding intermediate calculation and background material etc. 
 
 
 
 
Abstracts with downloadable PDF files of  
Discussion Papers are available on the Internet: http://www.ssb.no 
 
 
For printed Discussion Papers contact: 
 
Statistics Norway 
Sales- and subscription service  
N-2225 Kongsvinger 
 
Telephone: +47 62 88 55 00 
Telefax: +47 62 88 55 95 
E-mail:  Salg-abonnement@ssb.no 
1. Introduction
In their influential study, Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1994) [2] (abbreviated as
BGM) introduced an empirical implementation of rational addiction theory. They offered
an Euler equation where current consumption is expressed as a function of past consump-
tion, current price, but also future consumption. An attractive feature of their approach
is that the hypotheses of rational addiction, myopic addiction, and non-addiction can be
distinguished using standard statistical tests for the coefficients in the Euler equation.
The BGM approach has influenced a large number of papers, ranging from direct ap-
plications to studies with extensions in various directions, e.g. Pacula [8], Labeaga [4],
Baltagi and Griffin [1], and Gruber and Ko¨szegi [3].
Previous studies seem to have ignored some basic flaws in the BGM approach. First,
not all coefficients in the Euler equation are structural parameters. Some of the coeffi-
cients which BGM treat as constants are logically functions of prices, and hence, act as
endogenous variables for units facing different sets of prices. Even for a single consumer,
coefficient constancy relies on the assumption that the consumer perfectly foresees future
prices, not only one period ahead, but in all future periods. Second, myopic behavior
implies coefficient variability, also when the assumption of perfect foresight holds. Third,
the choices of a non-addicted consumer are influenced by past consumption, and a myopic
and a rational non-addict will behave differently.
These problems make standard statistical methods for testing the hypothesis of rational
addiction against the alternatives inappropriate. It is unclear how results from analyses
based on the BGM approach can be taken as evidence for, or against, rational addiction
theory. All problems are fundamental logical problems, in the sense that their presence do
not depend on the existence of statistical problems such as multicollinearity, measurement
errors, or small samples.
2. A summary of the BGM approach
BGM choose a discrete time framework and assume that the instantaneous utility
function is quadratic and concave with the form
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2
c2t−1 + u1yytct + u2yytct−1 + u12ctct−1,
where yt and ct is consumption of a composite non-addictive commodity and the addic-
tive commodity in period t, respectively. A life-cycle variable, et, which enters in their
instantaneous utility function is omitted, since it is not needed for the discussion here.
The rational addict faces the intertemporal maximization problem
(2) max
(c1,c2,...),(y1,y2,...)
∞∑
t=1
βt−1U(yt, ct, ct−1) s.t.
∞∑
t=1
βt−1(yt + Ptct) = A0,
where c0 is given, Pt is the price of the addictive commodity – the non-addictive commod-
ity is taken as numeraire – A0 is the present value of wealth, and the subjective discount
factor, β, is assumed to be equal to the market discount factor. Effects of consumption
on the present value of wealth or the length of life are ignored. The first order conditions
are
∂U (yt, ct, ct−1)
∂yt
= λ, t = 1, 2, . . . ,(3)
∂U (yt, ct, ct−1)
∂ct
+ β
∂U (yt+1, ct+1, ct)
∂ct−1
= λPt, t = 1, 2, . . . ,(4)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the intertemporal budget constraint, that is, the
marginal utility of wealth.
The structural part of BGM’s econometric Euler equation is obtained by solving the
first order condition for yt, and inserting the result for yt (and yt+1) in the first order
condition for ct,
(5) ct = θ0 + θct−1 + βθct+1 + θ1Pt, t = 1, 2, . . . ,
5where
θ0 =
−(u1y + βu2y)λ
(u11uyy − u21y) + β(u22uyy − u22y)
,(6)
θ =
−(u12uyy − u1yu2y)
(u11uyy − u21y + β(u22uyy − u22y))
,(7)
θ1 =
uyyλ
(u11uyy − u21y) + β(u22uyy − u22y)
.(8)
BGM suppress the constant term θ0, but as it has some relevance for the points to be
made, I will include it.
3. BGM’s Euler equation coefficients are not structural parameters
BGM seem to ignore the fact that θ0 and θ1 are functions of prices in all periods. Both
of these coefficients depend on the optimal value of λ, cf. (6) and (8), which obviously
is a function of prices in all periods. An example can be found in an appendix where
they derive price effects based on the solution to the Euler equation when interpreted
as a difference equation. It is easy to verify that in their expressions for derivatives of
consumption with respect to prices, θ1 enters as a constant and not as a function of the
price path. Except for being a symptom of a flawed interpretation, this is a correctable
formal problem which is not severe.
The erroneous interpretation of the Euler equation has more important consequences in
empirical applications. Across a panel of observation units – persons, states, or countries
– the coefficients will be different, unless the price paths are identical for all units. But
there are interpretational problems in single time series also. Suppose we were to estimate
the Euler equation using a data set covering a period in which a large tax hike increased
the price of the addictive good. Then, the coefficients in the Euler equation would depend
on whether the price increase was anticipated or not. If all assumptions are satisfied, the
price hike would have been anticipated and all would have been fine. But if the price hike
was unanticipated, the coefficients in the Euler equation would have shifted. Should one
allow the coefficients to shift in estimations, or simply assume that they are constants?
The latter alternative would have been valid only if the price change had been perfectly
6anticipated in a distant past, and by choosing this alternative we impose rationality as an
a priori restriction. The situation is likely to be even more difficult when price changes
occur frequently, which often is the case in non-experimental data.
A second unrealistic assumption in the BGM approach is that the subjective rate of
discounting equals the market rate, and that both are constant. Allowing the subjective
rate to vary over time raises questions with respect to the consumers’ ability to form
time-consistent plans. I will not discuss the different aspects of such questions, as they
have been treated thoroughly elsewhere, see Strotz [11], Laibson [5], O’Donoghue and
Rabin [6], Gruber and Ko¨szegi [3], and Orphanides and Zervos [7], to only mention a
few. Instead, assume that the subjective and the market rate of discounting are constants,
but not equal, and denote them by β and γ, respectively. If we let γ replace β in the
budget constraint in (2) and follow the same procedure when deriving the Euler equation,
we find that (6) and (8) are replaced by
θ0t = θ0 =
−(u1y + βu2y)
(
γ
β
)t−1
λ
(u11uyy − u21y) + β(u22uyy − u22y)
,(9)
θ1t = θ1 =
uyy
(
γ
β
)t−1
λ
(u11uyy − u21y) + β(u22uyy − u22y)
.(10)
These coefficients are clearly period specific, making it hard to interpret BGM’s estima-
tion results, unless one firmly believes that the market and the subjective discount rates
are equal and constant. Needless to say, the interpretation is even harder in situations
where the market discount rate is not a constant.
4. BGM’s myopic agent is not time consistent, which implies coefficient
variability
In order to test the rational addiction theory, at least one non-rational alternative
hypothesis is needed. BGM introduce the alternative of myopic agents and relates it to
the rational addiction model in the following way:
”To maintain as much similarity to the previous model as possible, we use
the same utility function and the same assumptions about the goods [y]
7and [c]. The key distinction is that myopic individuals fail to consider the
impact of current consumption on future utility and future consumption.
Analytically, this corresponds to individuals using a first order condition
that does not contain the future effect [β × ∂U (yt+1, ct+1, ct) /∂ct−1].”
(BGM p. 400)
”Myopic behavior implies that the coefficient on [...] future consumption
should be zero, while the rational model implies that it should have the
same sign as the coefficient on lagged consumption.” (BGM p. 401)
BGM do not offer a fully formal definition of myopia, so an interpretation is needed.
They refer to Pollak [9] [10], which basically modify static demand or utility functions
to allow past consumption to affect current behavior. According to Pollak’s approach,
the consumer is not fully rational and does not solve a full intertemporal problem. In-
stead, she solves a sequence of static one-period problems, where the influence of today’s
consumption on future periods’ tastes is not accounted for. A reasonable interpretation
of BGM’s informal definition, which has similarities with Pollak’s approach, is that the
myopic agent (erroneously) believes that her instantaneous utility function will be inde-
pendent of the consumption of the addictive good, but that in all other respects, she is
identical to the rational addict. Formally, the maximization problem she solves is then
(11) max
(c1,c2,...),(y1,y2,...)
∞∑
t=1
βt−1U(yt, ct; c0) s.t.
∞∑
t=1
βt−1(yt + Ptct) = A0,
where c0 is regarded as a constant over all periods (in contrast to the rational ad-
diction case above). It is straightforward to show that the first order conditions of
this problem are similar to the conditions of the rational addict, except that the term
β × ∂U (yt+1, ct+1, ct) /∂ct−1 is omitted.1
But this is not the full story. Following the same procedure as for the rational addict,
we obtain the Euler equation
(12) ct = θ˜0 + θ˜c0 + θ˜1Pt, t = 1, 2, . . . ,
1Other authors in the rational addiction literature relate the term ”myopia” to the discount function,
e.g. assume an infinite subjective interest rate. However, this does not fit neither Pollak’s approach nor
BGM’s informal definition and claimed consequences.
8where
θ˜0 =
−u1yλ
u11uyy − u21y
,(13)
θ˜ =
− (u12uyy − u1yu2y)
u11uyy − u21y
,(14)
θ˜1 =
uyyλ
u11uyy − u21y
.(15)
In agreement with BGM’s claims, future consumption does not enter in (12). But com-
pared with (5), past consumption is replaced with c0. Since c0 is a constant for all future
periods, the Euler equation seems degenerated, and variation in current consumption is
explained only by changes in current price.
However, if the myopic agent is allowed to reconsider her plans later on, she will not
stick to the original plan.2 A rational addict, on the other hand, will always stick to the
original plan as long as the original expectations are fulfilled and the other assumptions
are satisfied. Suppose the myopic agent chooses c1 in the first period, then the optimal
plan, as viewed from the second period would solve
(16) max
(c2,c3,...),(y2,y3,...)
∞∑
t=2
βt−1U(yt, ct; c1) s.t.
∞∑
t=2
βt−1(yt + Ptct) = A1,
where A1 is the remaining present value of wealth, evaluated in the second period. This
would yield a solution different from (11), unless c0 and c1 accidentally are identical.
Similarly, the optimization problem in succeeding periods will be updated, and in each
period the consumption in the previous period is regarded as a fixed constant in the
instantaneous utility function.3 The Euler equation describing the actually followed
consumption path, which is updated accordingly, is not degenerated and can be written
2If she is not allowed to reconsider her plans, she will be forced to be time consistent. Then, since she
is not addicted in the first period, there will be no way to identify her addiction by only observing her
consumption path.
3This behavior seems quite irrational. The consumer is able to correctly solve and update the intertem-
poral optimization problem, but she never realizes that it is past consumption which causes the need for
updating the previously formed plans. Such irrationality was common in several habit formation models
prior to the rational habit – and rational addiction – models.
9as
(17) ct = θ˜0t + θ˜ct−1 + θ˜1tPt, t = 1, 2, . . . .
An important distinction of (17) from the corresponding equation for the rational addict
(5), is that θ˜0t and θ˜1t are not constants. They depend on λ, which will vary as time
goes by, since the myopic addict fails to follow a time consistent consumption path
5. BGM’s non-addict is influenced by past consumption, which makes a
rational non-addict and a myopic non-addict behave differently
BGM also consider the alternative hypothesis that both commodities are non-addictive,
where addiction is defined and related to θ in the Euler equation in the passage:
”... a good is addictive if and only if an increase in past consumption
leads to an increase in current consumption holding current prices [...]
and the marginal utility of wealth fixed. [...] This definition means that
a good is addictive if θ > 0” (BGM p. 399)
Strictly interpreted this statement implies that if θ ≤ 0, the good is non-addictive. For the
present purpose, it is sufficient to consider the case when θ is exactly equal to zero, that
is when u12uyy = u1yu2y. Let U0(yt, ct, ct−1) denote the instantaneous utility function
in this case, and let it replace the instantaneous utility functions in (2), (11), and (16).
The situation, and the results, are mainly as described in the previous section, except
that both in the rational addiction and in the myopic addiction case, the coefficients on
future and past consumption are zero. As before, the remaining constant term and the
coefficient on current price will vary in the myopic case, when the consumer is allowed
to revise her plans.
6. Discussion
The discussion in BGM suggest that myopic addiction and non-addiction can be tested
by standard tests on coefficients:
”the positive and significant past consumption coefficient is consistent
with the hypothesis that cigarette smoking is an addictive behavior. The
10
positive and significant future consumption coefficient [...] is consistent
with the hypothesis of rational addiction and inconsistent with the hy-
pothesis of myopic addiction” (BGM p. 407)
But as shown above, the hypotheses of rational addiction, myopic addiction and non-
addiction are not neatly nested. Given that the assumption of perfect foresight holds,
the coefficient on future consumption is zero in the Euler equation of a myopic agent,
whereas the constant term and the coefficient on current price will vary. For a non-
addicted consumer, both the coefficients on past and future consumption are zero, and
for the myopic non-addict, the constant term and the coefficient on current price will
vary. If unforeseen price changes occur, the constant term and the coefficient on current
price will change, for all types of agents considered here. Standard tests of significance
rely on the assumption that all coefficients under test are constant parameters under
the alternative hypothesis. Since this assumption is not valid in the BGM approach,
a different testing scheme is required. As long as this lacuna is present, results from
analyses based on the BGM approach can hardly be held as evidence for, or against,
rational addiction theory.
Finally, a frequent misconception is that the rational addict takes future prices into
account, but that the myopic agent does not. This may stem from a passage in BGM,
probably referring to the Euler equations of the two agents:
”Future price (and consumption) changes have no impact on the current
consumption of a myopic addict, but they have significant effects on the
current consumption of a rational addict.” (BGM pp. 400–401)
It is clear that an addict behaving according to the rational addiction theory is perfectly
able to handling any anticipated price change. But there is nothing in BGM’s definitions
that make the myopic addict less capable. In fact, when one correctly interpret the Euler
equation coefficients as functions of prices, and not constants, it is obvious that a myopic
agent’s current consumption is influenced by future prices.
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